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Where Was Canada?: The Canadian Military Contribution to the British 
Commonwealth Second World War Campaign in North Africa 
 
With the final battle of El Alamein drawing to a close on 15 November 1942 a radio broadcast by 
the journalist L.S.B. Shapiro, heard nationally on the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
network, drew its listeners’ attention to North Africa and the offensive that had just been fought. 
Having highlighted that it had been a largely Commonwealth military coalition operating in that 
theatre, the broadcast noted that Canadians were not part of it and asked “What reason lies behind 
the extraordinary fact that the first of all overseas armies to reach the European theatre – remains 
the last to go into action?”.1 This was not the first time this question had been asked. For more 
than two years the British Empire’s principal military effort had been watched keenly by many 
Canadians who could not understand why their own military forces were not involved. The 
failure to join the battles fought in the Western Desert and the Middle East was a result of the 
policy pursued by prime minister William Lyon Mackenzie King supported, from mid-1940 
onwards, by his two senior military commanders Harry Crerar and Andrew McNaughton. Whilst 
the political leader was concerned about the potential domestic implications of committing troops 
overseas, the officers were equally content to approve the opportunity offered to them by their 
British counterparts not to take part in the Mediterranean campaign. Canadian troops would 
instead garrison the United Kingdom in the face of a potential German invasion and this allowed 
the opportunity to use the time and space provided by an increasingly spurious threat to train and 
develop the huge military organisation that would eventually play a leading role in the invasion 
of Europe. With all of the principals in agreement, this mutually beneficial understanding, 
unpalatable as it was to some parts of domestic public opinion, meant that the victory in the North 
Africa would be won by a British-led coalition that was almost entirely lacking any Canadian 
involvement.2 
 
As one of Canada’s most distinguished recent historians noted more than forty years ago, in 
September 1939 there ‘was no enthusiasm’ for what he termed as ‘a war of limited liability’.3 
Indeed, this analysis has been universally accepted since the first wartime examination of 
Canadian military policy by Colonel Charles Stacey, later to become “Canada’s foremost military 
                                                          
1 “SHAPIRO broadcast for 15 Nov 1942,” Extract, Publicity – General, PA 3-7, A.G.L. McNaughton 
Papers, MG 30, E133, Series III, Vol.144, Library and Archives Canada (hereafter ‘LAC’). 
2 John Nelson Rickard, The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L McNaughton and the 
Canadian Army, 1939-1943 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 46-53. 
3 J.L. Granatstein, Canada’s War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government 1939-1945 (Toronto: 
Oxford University Press, 1975), 19, 420. 
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historian”, and then expanded upon in the subsequent substantial body of work he produced.4 Yet 
at the time there was plenty of evidence to support the view that a great deal was in fact being 
done. A report in the journal of the London-based Royal United Services Institution, published 
before the outbreak of the Second World War, concluded that Canada’s re-armament plans 
seemed broad and “directed in part towards objects other than those of purely local defence”.5 It 
noted that its resources, both in terms of manpower and industrial capacity, were far greater than 
those of any of the other Dominions and in a prolonged struggle these could prove “a decisive 
factor in achieving victory”. From the earliest days of the war there was also the evidence offered 
by the Empire Air Training Plan, an agreement to use the safety of Canadian skies to prepare 
airmen who would then be able to launch the bombing campaign over occupied Europe which 
was prominently reported on by the media throughout the British Empire.6  
 
This apparent dichotomy was recognised by those British diplomats tasked with managing 
relations between London and Ottawa. The privately circulated views of Lord Tweedsmuir, the 
British Governor-General, described Canada’s war effort as “half-detached and half-embroiled”.7 
Sir Gerald Campbell, Britain’s High Commissioner, wrote back to London in December 1939 
that the “official attitude to the war is lukewarm; it is a fact which we ourselves know only too 
well, it is a fact which is clear to the people of the United States. I think the latter will again 
regard Canada as a warrior nation when they see Canadian forces in the front line: but not if they 
consist of only one Division and the remnants of a watered down air training scheme: and that I 
feel bound to conclude, is all that they will see, so long as Mr Mackenzie King's Government 
remains in power ... Whilst it is true that no one but [him] could have brought Canada into this 
war with such unanimity on all sides, it is equally true that we shall never get anywhere with the 
present Prime Minister in this war”.8 At this stage responsibility for this apparent contradiction 
                                                          
4 ‘Biography - Colonel Charles Perry Stacey, O.C., O.B.E., C.D., B.A., A.M., Ph.D., LL.D, D.Litt., D.Sc. 
Mil, F.R.S.C., 1906-1989’, National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Directorate of History and 
Heritage, http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/adh-sdh/bio/index-eng.asp [accessed, 25 April 
2016]. See C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada: A Survey of Defence Policies and Strategic 
Conditions Past and Present (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940); Colonel C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War – 
Volume 1, The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Official History of the Canadian Army in the 
Second World War) (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1957); C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men 
and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer, 1970). 
5 “Re-Armament in the Dominions,” Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 84, 534 (1939): 262. 
6 Andrew Stewart, “The British Government and the 1939 Negotiations for the Empire Air Training Plan,” 
The Round Table: The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs 93, 377 (Oct. 2004): 739-754; 
Kent Fedorowich, “Sir Gerald Campbell and the British High Commission in Wartime Ottawa, 1938-
1940,” War in History 18, 3 (July 2011): 357-385. 
7 John Buchan, Memory Hold-the-Door (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1945), 289. 
8 Minute by Cavendish Bentinck (Foreign Office), 12 January 1940, FO371/25224, The National 
Archives, London (hereafter ‘TNA’). 
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came down to Mackenzie King who, from well before the war’s outbreak, had argued for a 
restricted level of engagement based upon an appreciation that was “wrapped up in that theory of 
limited liability which [the British military thinker Basil] Liddell Hart was shortly to prescribe”.9 
This called for a reliance on blockade, economic warfare and only a token expeditionary force.10 
When he stepped down from his post at the end of 1940, grateful for the opportunity to move 
back to a diplomatic role in Washington, Campbell had wrote once again to colleagues in 
Whitehall but in an unofficial guise; now free of restrictions, he warned that the Dominion’s 
prime minister was “not a war, or a warlike, leader, and I sometimes feel Canada’s effort is too 
flabby”.11 As he concluded, “the people are keen, or as keen as anyone can be at a distance of 
3000 miles, and they want to produce men and munitions, but politics enters into the picture far 
too much”. 
 
Mackenzie King’s strategic outlook was based around the avoidance of significant casualties 
amongst Canadian troops and reducing the threat of political and social discord amongst the 
sizeable French-speaking population in Quebec who had no real sympathy with the British 
Empire. Fully aware of the potential dangers this held, particularly if there were to be any repeat 
of the First World War’s casualty figures, the country’s leader remained highly suspicious of 
Whitehall’s motives. Even so, there were sections of domestic public opinion that began to 
question why Canada was not doing more which made it increasingly difficult to avoid a more 
visible demonstration of support to Britain and the war. With some reluctance, a division was 
sent to Europe arriving in Scottish ports in December 1939, and, as the Allied position 
deteriorated rapidly following the German attack the following May, their commander, Major-
General McNaughton, looked to find a role for these troops.12 He did so in the knowledge that 
there was now “a considerable body of opinion” back at home that was not satisfied with a war 
effort which was viewed as not being an acceptable response to the crisis. The criticism was 
aimed at the government but more particularly the prime minister; it was surely no coincidence 
that he now confided to his diary that it was right and proper for Canada to stand by the Mother 
                                                          
9 Adrian Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War, 1939-1945,” Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution 90, 637 (February 1965): 30, 33. 
10 Brandey Barton, “Public Opinion and National Prestige: The Politics of Canadian Army Participation in 
the Invasion of Sicily, 1942-1943,” Canadian Military History 15, 2 (Spring 2006): 23-34; Galen Roger 
Perras, “No Need to Send an Army Across the Pacific: Mackenzie King and the Pacific Conflict, 1939-
1945,” in John English, Kenneth McLaughlin and P. Whitney Lackenbauer (eds.), Mackenzie King: 
Citizenship and Community (Toronto: Robin Brass Studios, 2003), 124-150. 
11 Campbell to Batterbee, 20 January 1941, Sir Harry Batterbee Papers, Rhodes House Library, Oxford, 
6/2 
12 Andrew Stewart, “The Battle for Britain,” History Today 65, 6 (June 2015): 19-26; Rickard, The 
Politics of Command, 39-45; W.C. Hankinson (British High Commission, Ottawa) to Eric Machtig (DO), 
28 May 1940, DO121/112, TNA.  
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Country in striking what could potentially be “the last blow for the preservation of freedom”.13 
His determination to pursue a limited liability had been undermined and, according to the United 
States ambassador Jay Pierrepoint Moffat, Canada had reached “a crossroad” and the recent 
reverses in Europe had forced changes upon it.14 Steps were taken to dispatch a second division 
and mobilise a third (soon to be followed by the main elements of a fourth), authorisation was 
given for troops to be sent for garrison duties in Iceland and the West Indies, and four destroyers 
were committed to help support the Royal Navy. Even now the prime minister remained reluctant 
to see the men who had so enthusiastically volunteered sent to actual war zones. In June 
parliament approved the National Resources Mobilization Act which conscripted Canadians for 
home defence whilst at the same time explicitly confirming that they would not serve overseas if 
they did not want to be sent.  
 
The defeat of France had, however, apparently led to a realisation that this would now be a long 
war. In July 1940, a significant series of changes had taken place affecting the longer term use of 
Canadian military forces as the composition of the Cabinet War Committee changed. The 
successor to the short-lived Emergency Council, this was responsible for the consideration of 
questions of general policy and the coordination of all operations of the government and, since 
France’s surrender, with regular, often daily meetings, it had taken effective control of the 
country’s war effort.15 Plans badly needed some revision as, according to Stacey, the antipathy 
shown by the Canadian leader, most specifically towards the Army, had not eased. At the end of 
July, Mackenzie King and five of his Cabinet colleagues had made statements on the floor of the 
House of Commons in response to what a watching American observer termed “a growing 
Parliamentary and popular demand for a concise statement in regard to Canada’s war effort”.16 
Despite this, it was certainly the case that the Chiefs of Staff “faced a constant struggle to retain 
influence in ministerial circles”.17 The fact that until June 1942 they continued to be excluded 
from Cabinet War Committee meetings, and even at this stage an invitation was only extended to 
                                                          
13 C.P. Stacey, Canada and the Age of Conflict, Vol.II: 1921-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1981), 299. 
14 Moffat to Department, June 23, 1940, Canada, US Legation and Embassy Ottawa, General Records - 
Chancery, Box 60, RG84, National Archives, Maryland (hereafter ‘NARA’). 
15 J.E. Rea, T.A. Crerar: A Political Life (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1997), 205-206. 
16 “Memorandum for the Minister, Summarizing statements by six Cabinet Ministers with respect to 
Canada’s war effort,” August 1, 1940, Canada, US Legation and Embassy Ottawa, General Records - 
Chancery, Box 60, RG84, NARA. 
17 Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945, 129. 
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attend approximately two each month, remains an important consideration.18 As one historian has 
noted, this lack of military input restricted the ability to conduct strategic planning and ensured 
that Mackenzie King remained the dominant force in determining how policies and commitments 
were developed.19  
 
Two key appointments influenced events greatly. The first was in June 1940 when Colonel J.L. 
Ralston became the new Minister of National Defence replacing Norman Rogers, who had been 
killed tragically in an air accident.20 Time magazine described Ralston to its American readers as 
“one of Canada’s cleverest financial men” who had refused previously to join the cabinet but was 
now expected “because of his bulldog tenacity and narrow partisanship to become the 
Government’s strongest man”.21 The second important appointment saw the recall of Crerar from 
England, where he had been Chief of Staff at the Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) 
London, to become Chief of the General Staff (CGS). This was the key wartime role and he 
would subsequently be remembered as “unquestionably the most important Canadian soldier in 
the war”.22 Following his return home, Crerar almost immediately attended a War Committee 
meeting in Ottawa on 26 July 1940 at which he presented his assessment of the situation in 
Britain.23 This involved a review of various possible developments during which he emphasised 
that “Canada’s chief concern, in existing circumstances, was the British Isles; they were her best 
defensive line, and it was in her interest to give every possible assistance in maintaining it against 
Hitler”.24 He repeated an earlier conversation with General John Dill, Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (CIGS), in which the senior British military officer had told him that the chances 
were 60-40 that Germany would try and invade Britain within the next six weeks.25 Crerar’s 
conclusion was that in the first instance the maximum effort should be made to defend Britain, 
but, some thought should also be given about what contribution could be made later to defeating 
Germany. Hence, his recommendation that whilst the focus would be on sending more troops to 
the British Isles, the future development of suitable armoured formations should also be given a 
                                                          
18 Paul D. Dickson, “The Politics of Army Expansion: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Creation of the First 
Canadian Army, 1940-41,” The Journal of Military History 60, 2 (April 1996): 276. 
19 Ibid. 
20 “Obituary – Norman McLeod Rogers, 1894-1940,” Canadian Journal of Economics and Political 
Science 6, 3 (August 1940): 476-478. 
21 “All In,” Time, 18 September 1940. 
22 J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in the Second World War 
(Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 83. 
23 Colonel C.P. Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945: An Official Historical Summary (Ottawa: The 
King’s Printer, 1948), 28; Granatstein, The Generals, 93-95. 
24 Stacey, Six Years of War – Volume 1, 87-91. 
25 J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record; Volume 1, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1960), 129. 
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priority. With Dill having also told him that, if Britain was defeated, the Royal Navy would have 
to move its headquarters to Canada’s Atlantic coast, Crerar also urged that every measure be 
taken to prepare harbours and coast defences for this potential outcome.26 
 
Writing later to McNaughton, who had been in Britain since the previous December in command 
of the expanding Canadian military forces based in the country, Crerar confided that he had 
“found that as a result of a rather panicky outlook, the tendency [in Ottawa] was to look inward 
and think in terms of strict ‘continental’ defence”.27 He had worked on this “defeatist attitude” 
and believed that “to a considerable extent both in the War Cabinet and publicly … during the 
last month or so the accent has been placed on the ‘fortress Island’ being our first line of defence 
rather than the Atlantic sea-board”. The clearest evidence of this ‘change’ could be seen within 
the two detailed appreciations he produced on consecutive dates in late September 1940, both of 
which sought to consider how the Canadian Army would develop over the coming years and the 
role for which it would be used. The first of these outlined how the CGS saw the expansion of the 
Army taking place.28 According to Stacey his conclusion, based upon the recent experience of 
observing the French campaign, was that “an army of defensive type was bound to meet defeat”. 
This meant the development of a force based around modern artillery, armour and close-support 
aircraft and this would require the country’s industrial capacity to be turned over to its 
construction.29 With the assertion that Canada itself was not threatened so long as Britain was not 
overrun, this document also argued that the new modern Canadian military organisation should 
therefore be assembled at the Empire’s heart although this could only be done once it had been 
adequately equipped. It would consist of three infantry divisions, to be formed by early-1941 as a 
corps, with an armoured brigade to join it as soon as possible and another infantry division ready 
to proceed to Britain if required.30 
 
The second paper, ‘What should be the Nature of Canada’s Military Effort during the next year?’, 
sought to examine the strategic position of the dominion and the role that should be undertaken 
by Canadian forces.31 Its central position was that all Canadian planning should be an integral 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Crerar to McNaughton, 8 August/9 September 1940, McNaughton Papers, MG30 E133, Series III, 
Vol.227, LAC. 
28 “Canadian Army Programme for 1941,” 24 September 1940, Ralston Papers, MG27, Series III, B11, 
Vol.37, LAC. 
29 Stacey, The Canadian Army, 1939-1945, 28. 
30 Ibid. 
31 “What should be the Nature of Canada’s Military Effort during the next year?,” 25 September 1940, 
Crerar Papers, MG30, E157, Vol.23, LAC. 
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part of the war effort of the wider Empire and, as such, for the following twelve months, it should 
be based generally on the views of the British Chiefs of Staff. Prominent reference was therefore 
given to the conclusion that, for 1941, the strategy was to be one of attrition and recovering those 
British Imperial territories that had been lost, whilst taking every step to hold on to those that 
remained; the Empire was to be prepared to go on the offensive in the spring of the following 
year. In reviewing possible courses of action open to the Axis, it was indicated that attacks could 
be expected against Egypt. Indeed Crerar assessed that “all things considered” this would “seem 
to be the most probable course for the enemy to adopt” and the coming winter season would be 
the most likely time for this to take place.32 The Near East would therefore most likely be the 
zone of active operations at least until the following spring, when there would be a renewed 
prospect of an attempted invasion of Britain. The British interest in undertaking “decisive action 
against Italy herself and invasion of her African colonies” was referenced prominently as was 
defeating any attack in Libya or across the Mediterranean.33  
 
The prospect of Canadian forces forming part of Egypt’s defences was also listed as an option, 
but it was clear that no firm proposal was being made other than the generation of reinforcements 
and moving them to Britain.34 Indeed, it was also stated that only in the spring of 1942 could 
British Commonwealth forces begin to even consider anticipating moving to the offensive.35 
Crerar’s 1940 correspondence with McNaughton had, however, included a reference to a move 
elsewhere, “out of the UK and in some other area of operations where the Canadian Corps can 
better demonstrate its fighting power”; this tantalising reference concluded with a promise of 
confirmation within “the next few weeks” and this appeared to provide the details of what he was 
thinking.36 In an anonymous and slightly longer appreciation given to Colonel Ralston and simply 
entitled ‘Plans’, there was further evidence.37 Within it there was a discussion not merely of 
likely future manpower requirements and the possible theatres of war but also three clear roles 
that could be adopted by Canadian forces during the winter 1940-41 period. These were, in order: 
defence of the United Kingdom; raids on the continent; and “providing land forces to help in 
defending Egypt or, operating on a new front, if one develops, in North Africa”. The 
appreciations had appeared very much to place an emphasis on generating additional forces, both 
                                                          
32 Ibid., 2. 
33 “Plans – Appreciations Military Gen. (Secret) 1940-42,” 27 September 1940, pp.1-2, Ralston Papers, 
MG27 III, B11, Vol.37, LAC. 
34 Ibid., 4. 
35 Stacey, Six Years of War, 88. 
36 Crerar to McNaughton, 8 August/9 September 1940, A.G.L. McNaughton Papers, MG30, E133, Series 
III, Vol.227, LAC. 
37 “Plans,” 27 September 1940, p.4, Ralston Papers, MG27, Series III, B11, Vol.37, LAC. 
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infantry and armoured, for despatch to the United Kingdom, without offering any actual 
recommendation as to which specific role they would fill, but nothing was ruled out. 
 
The analysis being produced by Crerar and those around him was entirely accurate. A key 
appreciation delivered in the first week of September 1940 to the British War Cabinet made 
prominent reference to the strategic significance attached to the Middle East. Presented by the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee and issued under the signature of Dudley Pound, John Dill and 
Richard Peirse, its purpose was to examine “the factors affecting [Britain’s] ability to defeat 
Germany, and to make recommendations from the military point of view as to the policy which 
should govern our war effort and the future conduct of the war”.38 At various points in the 
document, the Middle Eastern threat was highlighted. As Germany needed to secure access to 
additional oil supplies and these would have to come via ship from Russia or Romania through 
the Black Sea, it was thought an attack by both of the European Axis partners was “likely” within 
the next six months. The capture of the port of Alexandria would not only mean the loss of a key 
base but also prevent British shipping from operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. There was 
also the added advantage of securing access to Egyptian cotton and establishing a route through 
the Suez Canal to provide support to Italian forces in Abyssinia. Hence it was considered to be 
the most likely form of Axis attack along with continuing efforts to attack shipping and ports in 
order to halt supplies and more general air attacks at British morale. It was also argued that the 
act of reinforcing the garrisons in the Middle East would be likely to prevent the Italians from 
achieving any major military success. The conclusion was that holding the position in the Middle 
East was “of the utmost importance to our strategy” both in terms of safeguarding supplies and 
preventing Germany and Italy from breaking the economic blockade which, at this stage in the 
war, was the most potent offensive weapon available to Britain. It was argued that the sending of 
reinforcements was “a matter of the greatest urgency”. 
 
On the first day of October 1940, the Cabinet War Committee gathered in Ottawa and the main 
item for discussion was Canada’s contribution to the Allied war effort for the coming year. 
Mackenzie King’s diaries provide the clearest insight into how the debate developed, at least in 
his eyes. He remained adamant, despite the earlier comments committing to greater troop 
numbers, that the Air Force should remain the largest Canadian contribution with the Navy 
next.39 As he put it “All present were agreed I think to that”. This was not true of Crerar who 
pressed for an increase for the Army which, he and his supporters believed, could be used more 
                                                          
38  “War Cabinet – Future Strategy,” WP(40)362, 4 September 1940, CAB66/11/42, TNA. 
39 Mackenzie King Diary, 1 October 1940, f.902, MG26-J13, LAC. 
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actively and the Canadian leader made reference to Crerar wanting “to have a Canadian Army 
serving in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere”.40 This was apparently not what the premier 
wanted to hear and he remained dismissive of such calls, using as his principal counter arguments 
the possibilities of the United States’ continuing lack of involvement in the war and 
developments in the Pacific of a negative nature. This not – particularly - persuasive approach 
concluded with a reversion to fiscal concerns and the argument that manpower and finance 
should be “put to the best advantage possible”.  
 
No more seems to have been said on the subject at this meeting, but, by the first week of 
December 1940, the internal discussion had become much more acute and domestic pressure 
appeared to have grown considerably. By November 1940 the Canadian media based in London 
were clamouring for any information about the role being played by the country’s troops. As one 
historian has commented, the little Canadian army “squatted in England much like an aborigine 
in a strange wilderness, self-conscious but safe; fulfilment of that promise to be ‘at Britain’s 
side’”.41 Even the decision to send a detachment of sappers to Gibraltar saw them approach the 
Ministry of Information and ask that they be “given an ‘even break’” if any formal announcement 
was to be made with some advance notice.42 Canadians back at home were said to be “peering out 
from behind the rather unexciting cloak of hemispheric defence” which left them “attracted by 
the glitter of Wavell’s victories in the Western Desert and the potentially rapid collapse of Italian 
military power in North Africa”.43 There was also some suggestion in other parts of the British 
Empire that if Canadian troops joined with the other Dominion forces fighting in this theatre 
there would be a better case for resurrecting the old Imperial War Cabinet, an idea that was 
bitterly opposed by Mackenzie King.44 He was in “no hurry to undermine his personal position” 
and could not see any value to reversing the previously agreed policy and “earmarking Canadian 
forces for operations which would bring no immediate political advantages either at home or 
abroad”.45 
 
Another three hour Cabinet War Committee meeting held at this point was recorded in the 
premier’s diary as having been “rather difficult and trying”, no doubt because the question was 
                                                          
40 Ibid. 
41 Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War,” 34. 
42 Canadian Military Headquarters GS Branch War Diary, 28 November 1940, WO 179/1, TNA. 
43 Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War,” 37. 
44 Andrew Stewart, Empire Lost; Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War (London: Continuum, 
2008), 51-54. 
45 Preston, “Canada and the Higher Direction of the Second World War,” 37. 
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raised once again of Canadian forces being dispatched from England to the Middle East.46 At this 
point, with Operation Compass the first major British Commonwealth offensive of the North 
African campaign about to start, the Western Desert appeared an obvious focus for attention. 
Mackenzie King’s view was that the Defence Department was “engineering” this debate, despite 
the opposition of the War Council, and such talk could lead to “annexionist (sic) sentiment 
growing up” although the argument he put forward once again seemed far from convincing. This 
meeting took place after Ralston had left for England, along with the Minister of Munitions and 
Supply C.D. Howe, and saw the prime minister once again strongly stating views that appeared 
almost completely at odds with the advice being issued from his senior Army advisor. He instead 
chose to highlight that the other Dominions were “all interested in that zone” and, although he did 
not explicitly say so, it was clear that it was not a theatre in which he had any interest.47 There 
was, however, by now a good deal of support amongst others for just this idea, notably from 
Charles ‘Chubby’ Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air, and James Gardiner, Minister 
for National War Service. They were prepared to back “the army people” arguing that the armed 
forces stationed overseas were anxious to fight, morale was suffering because of the lack of 
fighting and they should therefore be sent to where they could at once engage the enemy. With 
the prime minister clearly believing that the senior military officers had got to his Cabinet 
colleagues, there was actually some logic in at least part of what he had to say. He was certainly 
right in claiming that the Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans had a level of in 
interest in the African theatre which Canada did not. For the Antipodean members of the 
Commonwealth alliance this was a region in which they had fought during the last war and the 
defence of Suez was of course strategically of vital significance to them in terms of their home 
security. For Jan Smuts, the South African leader, future developments in Africa were of direct 
interest as he pondered the continent’s post-war future.48 For Canada there was no similar 
rationale to become involved. 
 
What it appeared to come down to, was Mackenzie King’s reluctance for there to be any 
expansion of Canadian involvement in the war. As he wrote in his diary, he had simply told the 
meeting that they “owed it to our men to seek to protect their lives”, although he did not go on to 
                                                          
46 Mackenzie King Diary, 4 December 1940, f.1037, MG26-J13, LAC.  
47 Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record; Volume 1, 156; Mackenzie King’s lack of enthusiasm for a 
North African expedition receives only this briefest of references in Pickersgill’s epic recounting of the 
premier’s diaries. 
48 John Agar-Hamilton to Basil Liddell Hart, 14 February 1959, Liddell Hart Papers, Liddell Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, London, LH 4/39. 
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say it this was best achieved in his view by not sending them to fight in North Africa’s deserts. 49 
At the same time the obvious and logical role was to continue to help defend Britain as had been 
concluded in the earlier appreciations.50 As these noted, if no attempt at invasion was made in 
1940, from mid-April of the following year, the threat would once again become imminent.51 
And in this line of his argument he had support from Angus Macdonald, Minister of National 
Defence for Naval Services, and Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice. The challenge remained, 
however, that not everybody agreed, as was highlighted by the Toronto Daily Star with its front 
page report that a decision would soon be taken as to whether Canadian troops would be sent to 
North Africa.52 The December 1940 story reported that it had previously been the case that “high 
Canadian officers” had opposed the idea of their troops being moved from the British home front 
to the Mediterranean, because it was believed that the war would be won or lost on the basis of 
the ability to defend Britain and then by re-invading Europe to attack Germany. This view was 
said to have changed as a result of the successes of the Royal Navy at the battle of Taranto and 
the skill shown by the Greeks in blunting the Italian invasion. In a typically mischievous piece of 
newspaper writing it was therefore suggested that the visit of Ralston and Crerar to London, 
which was then taking place, might result in a decision. 
 
Colonel Ralston and his CGS were indeed in Britain and just before Christmas 1940 they met the 
Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, and other senior British figures for what proved to be 
a crucial meeting. The outcome of this was a confirmation that Canada’s maximum contribution 
for the first half of the following year would be a fully staffed corps of three divisions along with 
a tank brigade. And, during the latter half of 1941 and the first quarter of 1942, an armoured 
division would also be provided.53 In anticipation of this meeting an internal briefing document 
had been prepared within the War Office in London although it is not clear as to the actual 
identity of the writer.54 Its tone was at times caustic, notably with the conclusion that there was 
some urgency about using Canadian troops already in Britain as they were “eating their heads 
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off” hence there was a need to “give them some employment which would serve as an outlet for 
their energy”. It was also acknowledged that with Australians and New Zealanders serving in the 
Middle East there was “a certain amount of inter-Dominion feeling” about their static role. The 
note therefore outlined four possible roles which were broadly similar to those identified 
previously by Crerar, the principal difference being the potential employment of Canadian troops 
in ‘irregular operations’. The Middle East was listed as the first possible option, but there were 
said to be serious objections not least because this would entail splitting the country’s contingent 
“with little hope of re-constitution at a later date”. Canada had also established base installations 
and moved its reinforcements to Britain at great expense and an onwards move to the Middle East 
might “not be well received”. As such it was argued that it made most sense for the country’s 
troops to be employed on the Atlantic sea-board, specifically in Britain, the Iberian Peninsula or 
north-west Africa. The unknown writer concluded by noting that such assessments it did not 
really matter as insufficient shipping meant Canadian forces could not be moved from Britain for 
a considerable time. This focus on the defence of the United Kingdom and building up sufficient 
forces to contribute towards longer-term strategic objectives was therefore very much in line with 
requests coming from the War Office in London. 
 
Ralston claimed that, during his London visit, he had encountered “no thought or desire to have 
Canadian troops go to Egypt”.55 As he told Mackenzie King, the intention was that Britain would 
continue to send large numbers of men to fight overseas, and she looked to Canada to help fill 
their places. So, while additional manpower was greatly needed, it was to be sent no further than 
the British Isles where it would wait to be used at some later stage.56 It was therefore approved 
that the year’s Army Programme would be shaped specifically around the requirements 
confirmed by the War Office. At no stage was reference made to any of this being intended for 
possible use in the Middle East. Indeed, Crerar produced a draft programme that he believed 
would find favour with his prime minister and those around him who wanted the defence focus to 
be on industrial development, hence its reference to the extension of the training period for troops 
as well as the significance it attached to the development of mechanized warfare and the need for 
more armoured units.57 His skilful championing of this revised strategic vision helped secure 
Mackenzie King’s endorsement which, with Ralston providing enthusiastic assistance, ensured 
that the proposals would be broadly accepted.58 The proposed composition reflected the general’s 
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longer-term aspirations “to increase its [the military’s] influence and the size of its forces” and 
most likely points to the real reason behind much of his interest in the Middle East campaigns, a 
negotiating point to achieve his ultimate aspiration. For all those senior figures in the Canadian 
and British military and government who were involved, their respective goals were well served 
by the agreements that were reached; any actual involvement in the Middle East would not have 
been in their respective interests unless this could have resulted in a decisive and rapid victory 
with little in the way of casualties or loss of equipment. 
 
Throughout the first half of 1941 there was only limited reference to the North African campaign. 
In a February statement to the Canadian House of Commons, Mackenzie King announced that 
during the previous three months 30,000 “units of armoured and other automotive equipment” 
had been delivered to the Middle East.59 With the situation worsening following Germany’s 
military intervention and the arrival of the Afrika Korps commanded by General Erwin Rommel, 
Moffat spoke with Crerar at an April lunch about the same subject.60 He already knew from 
previous conversations that the Canadian general did not favour dispersing those forces which 
were already overseas but the American ambassador now asked his guest if he thought there 
might be some pressure from the British authorities to transfer Canadian troops to the Middle 
East or even Greece. In response Crerar confirmed that there had been no suggestion made by the 
British authorities, partly because of the time element and partly because there was not enough 
shipping available to transport large numbers of men to the eastern Mediterranean. Crerar’s 
estimation was that, with all the equipment of a modern division, it would take 10-15 tons of 
shipping per man. That same month, Malcolm MacDonald, the new British High Commissioner, 
gave a Sunday night radio address to the Canadian public in which he tried to explain why 
Canadian troops were being kept in Britain.61 As he put it, they had been trained for defensive 
operations and given the place of honour at “the spearhead of that defence”, a strange mixture of 
fighting roles if ever there was one.  
 
In reporting these comments, the Toronto Daily Star appeared now to recant on its earlier 
criticism and offered its own analysis about the “unhappy speculation” that had questioned why 
Canada’s troops remained in Britain when soldiers from the other Dominions were fighting in 
North Africa and Greece. The view was offered that, “the sense of disappointment has perhaps 
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been natural that it has not been the result of clear thinking. It has not been the result of 
visualising the war picture as a whole but rather of concentrating upon those theatres in which 
there has been the greatest action”.62 Finally, during a May debate, a Canadian parliamentarian 
posed the rhetorical question as to why his country’s troops had not been in the Libyan desert.63 
Frederick MacKenzie was a Liberal who had seen service in Egypt and at Gallipoli during the 
First World War. He now put forward two reasons as to why it was that only Anzac forces “were 
chasing Italians over the sands of North Africa”. Apart from repeating MacDonald’s comments 
he also suggested that it would not have been prudent to send men used to Canada’s climate to 
campaign in a place with so different a one. The issue was being contained, but Crerar was 
conscious that it was beginning to have an adverse effect on public confidence in the army.64 
 
A further visit to London by Colonel Ralston in October 1941 saw the Canadian role discussed 
once again. According to one well researched account, ever since his arrival nearly two years 
earlier, McNaughton had faced the problem of “finding feasible military operations to participate 
in with the rapidly expanding British Army” and, during this intervening period, whilst he had 
been willing to fight he was determined to keep his forces fighting together.65 Now he was told 
by the Assistant CIGS, General Gordon Macready, that there was still no plan to send Canadian 
forces in the United Kingdom to “a distant theatre of operations”, repeating the discussion that 
had taken place between Churchill and Mackenzie King during the latter’s August visit to 
Britain.66 This decision was in large part based around the belief that Germany still posed a 
potent threat to the home islands; the assessment was that Hitler could concentrate his air and 
land forces more quickly than adequate British Commonwealth forces could be recovered from 
overseas to deter him. There was also a concern that any despatch of the Canadian Corps would 
encourage an invasion attempt – the Canadians would therefore stay, in part to provide a 
significant counter-attack force but also to act as a visible deterrent. It was also clear from 
discussions amongst the Canadians that there continued to be considerable concerns about the 
effect of splitting the corps to conduct operations in a theatre such as the Middle East.67 Crerar 
and McNaughton agreed that whilst such a move would be well received by the Canadian public, 
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it would not resolve the bigger question of how overseas forces could best be used and would 
inevitably lower the morale of those troops who were retained in Britain. 
 
There was also another consideration, “the extreme suitability” of Canadian forces for commando 
operations and large-scale raids, something that had first been raised during the visit the previous 
December. At lunch Major-General John Kennedy, the Director of Military Operations at the 
War Office, provided McNaughton with details on past and potential future operations and it was 
clear from their conversation that the Canadians were being considered in this role.68 In a later 
discussion with Ralston and Crerar, some details were offered about British plans for the 
Dominion’s forces including a possible role assisting in the defence of Spain or Spanish Morocco 
and “temporary employment” in operations in Norway. In addition to this, and with the exception 
of minor raids, “no specific operations were under consideration”. The Canadian commander also 
repeated that there had been no reference to using part of the Corps in a theatre such as the 
Middle East.69 David Margesson, the Secretary of State for War, had already confirmed to 
Ralston that there still remained a focus on keeping enough forces in Britain to withstand any 
potential invasion, with the minimum requirement calculated as 25 divisions, six of these being 
armoured formations.70 Supporting this contingency plan remained the Canadian main effort. The 
Canadian minister in turn reiterated that his government was “fully prepared” to sanction the use 
of the country’s troops in any military operations that were recommended to them from London 
and, whilst he was not pressing for their use, there were “no restrictive tendencies on the part of 
the Canadian Government”.71 At the same time, it was also once again repeated that “the most 
helpful addition to the Canadian forces overseas would be in armoured formations”; more than 
one of the British participants spelled this out as meaning an additional Armoured Division. This 
followed on from a conversation Ralston had with General Dill, during which he had described 
the Canadian military role as, firstly “to defend the citadel”, and second to move into North 
Africa, Italy and Spain, possibly the Middle East and for raids.72 In addition there was also the 
possibility of exploiting “uprisings in occupied territories” although expecting any of these at this 
stage would be premature. 
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Ralston recorded in his diary entry of the meeting with Margesson that he had “referred to the 
employment of Canadians and said I wanted to repeat what had been said over and over again, 
namely, that Canadians were for service wherever and whenever they could best be used”.73 
Suggesting that they be used “simply to quieten public opinion” was not something he was 
willing to do but the merits of the situation would dictate; this assessment was readily agreed 
upon by the British minister. At the following meeting with him the next week he was told that 
the “chief necessity was the maintenance of strategic reserves and use where needed”, and the 
Canadians had not been assigned any of the ‘special tasks’ such as the possibility of conducting a 
raid against the French port of Brest.74 They also discussed how the retaining of troops in Britain 
was being seen both in Canada and elsewhere. Ralston said that some people were attempting to 
portray this as a ‘restriction’ on their movement; Margesson’s response was to describe this as 
“an absolute lie” from “evilly disposed persons”. Yet, at the same time, Ralston also met with 
King George VI who he recorded as being “a little itchy” about the lack of activity, although it 
was not clear whether this referred specifically to the Canadian forces or if it was a comment 
about the general progress of the war.75  
 
Following a meeting with Churchill on 25 October 1941, Ralston’s short-hand diary note 
specifically records the British leader as having said “pity to break up Corps – one division to 
Middle East not desirable” before going on to say that he had “in mind some other possibilities” 
although he was not so sure about these.76 He went on to say in reference to events then taking 
place at Tobruk that it was not “our [British] fault and not yours [Canadian] – knows boys want 
to get at him [Hitler] – opportunity will come – They also serve who only stand and wait”.77 This 
view was obviously commonly known as it was reiterated in a conversation between Moffat and 
MacDonald in October 1941, shortly after the British high commissioner had returned from a 
visit to London. 78 In his report back to Washington the American ambassador reported that the 
British diplomat had urged Churchill “to send at least some Canadian troops into the fighting 
line”. This recommendation had been put forward for the benefit it would have on the morale of 
the troops and the Canadian public, but the British leader refused “point blank” saying that he 
was not planning to disrupt other units or supply lines by “adding a small group of Canadians 
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here and there”. Only the month before, he had expressed concern that Britain would be seen as 
“seeming to fight all our battles in the Middle East only with Dominion troops”.79 Whilst this was 
a private reference to the increasingly public dispute the British premier was having with 
Australia, it may well have influenced his thinking; it was entirely in line with a policy that had 
existed for nearly a year.80 At the same time the plans for Operation Crusader, the huge British 
Commonwealth offensive that was scheduled to commence the following month, certainly did 
not point to there being any shortages in manpower. 
 
Despite this offensive’s only mixed results, there remained no apparent interest for Canadian 
forces to be sent out to North Africa. When McNaughton returned to Ottawa in January 1942 for 
meetings, he brought with him confirmation from the CIGS, General Sir Alan Brooke, that “it 
was his wish to employ [Canadian Forces] in the defence of [Britain] until such time as 
operations on the Continent of Europe become possible”.81 As the Canadian general confided to 
King George VI during a private meeting in April, it remained the intention that the Canadian 
military were not being dispersed but instead concentrated in what he thought was “the decisive 
theatre of war”.82 Nonetheless, the problem of how to keep these expanding forces occupied was 
mounting. With some sections of the British media giving prominence to reports of criminal acts 
involving Canadian troops, there were also two occasions during that spring when they booed a 
car carrying Montgomery; with Brooke and General Bernard Paget, Commander-in-Chief Home 
Forces, the other occupants, McNaughton felt obliged to apologise personally to each of them 
whilst Crerar began an enquiry.83 There was, however, also some sympathy shown in other 
publications where it was noted that the role the Canadians continued to play was a necessary 
one, if not always the most fulfilling. The News of the World published a leading article in late 
January 1942, which highlighted the “thankless, unspectacular job” they had performed helping 
guard Britain and “forced by circumstances beyond their control to remain in comparative 
idleness” whilst the rest of the Empire fought.84  
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One possible solution was to send two experienced Canadian officers to North Africa to act as 
observers, one to report on operations, the other on administrative methods, with the intention 
that their observations would lead to improvements in organisation and training of the forces back 
in Britain. The initial two lieutenant-colonels who were selected travelled at the beginning of 
December 1941 with instructions to send monthly reports of what they witnessed in their role as 
observers to the Middle East Forces.85 Later arrangements would see much larger numbers of 
Canadian officers and soldiers being attached to Lt-General K.A.N. Anderson’s First Army 
operating in Tunisia where they would gain “invaluable” experience and they reported back to 
McNaughton in June 1942 after several months spent in theatre.86 Following on from the 
disastrous use of Canadian forces as part of the August 1942 raid on the French port of Dieppe, 
the decision was taken to send more troops to North Africa and the first of five small groups 
arrived in Algiers in January 1943 to spend a period of three months attached to units of the First 
British Army. Most were assigned to the 78th Infantry Division and the 6th Armoured Division; 
as the official history notes “at one point an infantry unit of the [latter] had a Canadian second-in-
command and three Canadian company commanders”.87 This arrangement continued until the 
end of the campaign by which point 201 officers and 147 non-commissioned officers had seen 
service and, aside from the eight men who were killed, the majority returned to Britain and their 
original units bringing a much greater level of battle experience. Indeed Stacey noted that the 
value of what they learnt was “beyond question” despite the limitations that were imposed on the 
numbers involved.88 Other than the seventeen Royal Canadian Navy corvettes to support the 
Operation TORCH invasion fleet and follow-up convoys, this was the extent of the direct military 
contribution to the war fought in North Africa although much was made post-war that over half 
of the vehicles used by the Eighth Army having been produced in Canada.89 
 
The reality was that the absence of its military forces from the deserts of North Africa was in 
many respects a welcome outcome both for senior Canadian and British military and political 
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leaders, Indeed, whilst never being acknowledged as such, it was an arrangement that was in 
everybody’s interests. At no point did the senior British commanders in theatre indicate that they 
were short of manpower. Troops from the other Dominions, alongside the Indian Army and 
assorted other Allied contingents, ultimately proved sufficient to defeat their German and Italian 
opponents. At the same time there were perhaps also some concerns amongst the planners in 
London about the potential propaganda value to the Axis of having Canadian troops join the 
remainder of the Commonwealth coalition that had been assembled in the North African deserts. 
When Ambassador Moffat had spoken with his British counterpart MacDonald in December 
1942 he had been told that it was General McNaughton who bore the responsibility for there 
being no Canadian troops in the final El Alamein battle “as he insisted that they be maintained as 
a unit”.90 No reference was provided as to his source for this conclusion but, by this stage, Crerar 
and others were already starting to doubt McNaughton’s leadership qualities and his reputation 
began to decline until, in December 1943, his resignation was announced to a surprised Canadian 
public.91  
 
Until recently, the accepted post-war view remained that it was McNaughton who had been the 
driving force in shaping how the dominion’s troops in Britain were used.92 Yet it could be argued 
that the ever-expanding Canadian garrison force actually played a considerable role in the 
eventual victory that was won by the Eighth Army. Churchill remained convinced that the deserts 
of North African and the Middle East offered the British Empire’s best opportunity to 
demonstrate its military capabilities to a global audience. Troops and equipment could not 
continue to have been diverted away in the quantities that he demanded if they were also needed 
to guard Britain against a potential German threat and it was the Canadian presence which 
allowed him to pursue his vision for a grand strategy. There is, however, a question to be asked 
about what the Canadians could have offered in December 1940 to General Archie Wavell’s 
Western Desert Force and Operation Compass which achieved huge initial success but 
culminated just short of the key objective of the port of Tripoli. Australians and New Zealanders 
were shipped from Britain between September and December in order to take part in what was 
seen as a potentially critical attack. The arrival of an additional brigade of determined Dominion 
troops might have made all the difference in terms of changing the outcome of the entire 
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campaign. Mackenzie King could even have been able to claim a decisive military victory at 
virtually no political cost but this was not to be. 
